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Online platforms collect and infer detailed information about people and their5
behaviour, giving advertisers an unprecedented ability to reach specific groups of6
recipients. This ability to “microtarget” messages contrasts with people’s limited7
knowledge of what data platforms hold and how those data are used. Two on-8
line experiments (total N = 828) demonstrated that a short, simple intervention9
prompting participants to reflect on a targeted personality dimension boosted their10
ability to correctly identify the ads that were targeted at them by up to 26 percent-11
age points. Merely providing a description of the targeted personality dimension did12
not improve accuracy; accuracy increased when participants completed a short ques-13
tionnaire assessing the personality dimension—even when no personalized feedback14
was provided. We argue that such “boosting approaches,” which improve peoples’15
ability to detect advertising strategies, should be part of a policy mix aiming to16
increase platforms’ transparency and give people the competences necessary to re-17
claim their autonomy online.18
1
Introduction19
Advertisers have always sought to maximize the match between their messages and pre-20
sumed customers. There are few cosmetic ads in motorcycle magazines, and TV commer-21
cials rarely advertise toys after children are in bed. However, compared with traditional22
targeted advertising, online advertising o↵ers advertisers unprecedented ability to reach23
specific groups of recipients with tailored messages1;2. In addition, advertisers receive24
direct feedback on the reception of their message (e.g., via click-through rates), enabling25
them to further optimize their message and its targeting via large-scale A/B testing3;4.26
With increasing technological capacity and sophistication, these processes are becoming27
ever more opaque for the public and for targeted individuals, in particular5. This devel-28
opment further amplifies the asymmetry of knowledge between platforms and their users:29
Platforms collect and infer detailed information about users and their behaviour1;2. Users,30
by contrast, know little about what data the platforms hold and how those data are used31
to shape their online experience6;7. Here we investigate a short, simple intervention that32
aims to boost people’s competence to detect targeted messages and could contribute to33
counteracting this asymmetry. The intervention raises users’ awareness of personality34
dimensions8 that might be targeted, and enables them to detect a targeting strategy35
designed to exploit those dimensions.36
Here we define microtargeting as the method of addressing users based on “non-37
observable” features (e.g., partisanship, personality dimensions) rather than easily “ob-38
servable” demographic features such as age and gender. This type of targeting is by39
definition di cult to detect unless it is explicitly announced or labelled.40
Although the persuasive e↵ect of a single ad on a single individual may be relatively41
small9, the potential harms of microtargeting can scale up and propagate to the col-42
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lective10. Political online advertising, for example, generates billions of impressions on43
social media11, and it has been shown that even small visual details can a↵ect voting in-44
tentions12. Facebook’s hidden ad-delivery mechanisms can increase biases13 and polarize45
political campaigns14. More generally, increasingly precise microtargeting can harm the46
democratic process because manipulative messages directed at a specific, but not pub-47
licly known target audience, cannot be scrutinized and rebutted by political opponents48
in a free marketplace of ideas10. Furthermore, microtargeting includes “boosted organic49
content”⇤, that is, seemingly personal content that the platforms deliver to target audi-50
ences against payment of a fee. This blending of personal communication and advertising51
can increase the e↵ect of advertisements15 and, in political advertising, contributes to a52
distorted picture of democratic discourse16.53
Tech companies have taken some steps towards transparency in the form of ad li-54
braries†. These libraries compile ads run on the platforms along with information on the55
characteristics of the target audience. Due to their complexity and size, however, these56
libraries are unlikely to help end users; they mainly serve political analysts, journalists,57
and researchers. Moreover, the information documented on the target audience does not58
extend beyond coarse variables such as age group or region of residence. This coarseness59
prevents quantitative studies11 and rebuttal messages from political competitors17. Ad li-60
braries in their present form therefore cannot counter unduly manipulative microtargeting61
and its e↵ects on individuals.62
In addition to the collective harms for democracy, opaque targeting practices are at63
odds with attitudes across the political spectrum. In a recent representative survey in64
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States18, people were inclined to accept personal-65
⇤https://www.facebook.com/business/help/317083072148603
†E.g., https://www.facebook.com/ads/library and https://transparencyreport.google.com/
political-ads
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ization based on information that users typically provide knowingly (e.g., age or gender).66
However, they rejected the use of other types of data, especially information that cannot67
be easily observed or was not knowingly provided, such as political and sexual orientation68
or personality dimensions. These sensitive attributes can be inferred from behavioural69
data without users’ input, knowledge, or explicit consent1;19 by machine learning meth-70
ods that are inherently opaque (e.g., Facebook’s patent “Determining user personality71
characteristics from social networking system communications and characteristics” ‡).72
An experiment conducted on Facebook has suggested that inferred personality dimen-73
sions can be used to personalize ads: Participants were more likely to buy a product74
when they were targeted with an advertisement that matched their personality type (ex-75
travert vs. introvert)20. Other studies found that personality-based targeting increased76
engagement, but did not consistently change attitudes towards a product21. Recent results77
showed that personality-matching political advertising can be more e↵ective in influencing78
political attitudes and voting intentions than non-matching advertising22.79
Whatever the persuasive power of current practices, microtargeting lacks transparency80
and contributes to a growing knowledge gap between platforms and users. While platforms81
are becoming increasingly more sophisticated in collecting data and customizing user82
experiences, there is a dearth of e↵ective measures that could help counteract the adverse83
consequences of these developments and reduce the knowledge gap. Clearly, there is no84
silver bullet to redress this informational asymmetry, but a wide range of actions can and85
should be taken to increase people’s autonomy online7;23. At present, countermeasures86
include an assortment of regulations. One of the more forceful measures is to shield87
private data from being collected in the first place, using legislation such as the E.U.’s88
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Yet platforms often bypass the intent of the89
‡https://patents.google.com/patent/US8825764B2/en
4
regulation by using so-called “dark patterns,” which nudge users to disable the privacy-90
protecting defaults (e.g., by clicking on the visually more salient button)24. In addition,91
irrespective of the ban on collecting sensitive personal data, Facebook is still able to infer92
such information from behavioural data, and to segment users accordingly25.93
A di↵erent, but complementary, strategy to close the knowledge gap is to enhance94
users’ awareness of microtargeting practices. This approach may be more robust to con-95
stantly changing targeting methods than regulation of those can ever be. Awareness about96
microtargeting could empower users to deliberately ignore advertisements or discount po-97
litical messages that they identify as having been microtargeted. It has been shown that98
advertisements are less e↵ective when people find out that unacceptable practices have99
been used to target them (i.e., using information obtained from outside the platform or100
inferred without user input)26. In contrast, trust and e↵ectiveness may increase when the101
practices used are deemed acceptable26. However, current transparency measures, such102
as the “Why am I seeing this?” button on Facebook, provide only superficial information103
(e.g., “the advertiser wants to reach people who may be similar to their customers”) and104
have to be actively requested by users27. The GDPR mandates other ways to achieve105
transparency, such as users’ “right of access”§ to the data that platforms hold on them.¶106
Yet most users lack the technical sophistication, motivation, or time to explore those107
large, unstructured datasets28.108
Thus, although platforms are required to disclose the data they hold about users,109
in practice, for most users this requirement fails to open the platforms’ “black box”.110
Achieving e↵ective transparency—that demonstrably enables users to understand what111
platforms do with their data and what users’ choices imply, and to translate this knowledge112
§https://gdpr-info.eu/art-15-gdpr/
¶See, for example, https://myactivity.google.com/more-activity
or https://www.facebook.com/your_information.
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into behavior—is an important step towards more acceptable business practices and to113
regaining autonomy for users (e.g., by prompting people to adjust their privacy settings29).114
However, as reviewed above, most current transparency initiatives seem to be exercises in115
“nominal transparency” with no real regard for whether or not people actually read and116
digest the information or whether it has any e↵ect on their behaviour.117
Here we investigate a cognitive approach to counteract the information asymmetry,118
which explicitly aims to help people to cope with the lack of transparency. It is inspired by119
research showing that people can be psychologically “inoculated” against misinformation.120
For example, explaining misleading argumentation techniques reduces the influence of121
subsequently presented misinformation30;31. In this study, we test whether it is possible122
to inoculate people against personality-based microtargeting20 by alerting them to the123
personality dimension being targeted and thus increasing their ability to identify whether124
or not an advertisement is targeting them personally. If the success of the intervention125
depends primarily on people being aware of the personality dimension being targeted,126
then it may su ce to provide a description of that personality dimension. However,127
to the extent that people lack relevant self-knowledge8 about the targeted personality128
dimension, or fail to spontaneously connect their self-knowledge with the advertisements129
shown, the inoculation intervention may need to dig deeper. Against this background, we130
investigate three interventions that di↵er in their degree of personalization: (1) merely131
describing the targeted personality dimension, (2) having participants complete a short132
personality questionnaire (without providing feedback), and (3) providing participants133
with feedback on their personality based on their responses to the questionnaire. All134
three interventions are based on the notion of psychological inoculation, an instance of135
the class of “boosting” interventions, that are, interventions aimed at improving people’s136


























































“Do you think this ad is targeted at you?” (yes/no)
“Please identify those [ads] that target yourself: Do 
you think the ad is designed to appeal to people with 
your personality?"
Figure 1: Elements of the experimental setup used to test the boosting inter-
vention in Experiment 1. a Feedback screen shown to participants after completion
of an 8-item personality questionnaire gauging their extraversion level (boosting condi-
tion), which includes feedback on their relative rank within an age-matched norm popu-
lation (from33). b Instructions of the detection task and example stimulus (for the full
set of stimuli, see Fig. S8). c Parallel experimental design of the boosting and control
conditions—the only di↵erence is that the order of the two personality questionnaires (ex-
traversion and A nity for Technology Interaction, ATI) and the corresponding feedback
were swapped (i.e., before vs. after the detection task).
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In two preregistered online studies, we tested the e↵ectiveness of the inoculation ap-138
proach to boost people’s ability to identify ads targeted at their personality in terms of139
the extraversion–introversion spectrum (N = 828; recruited via Prolific Academic). We140
used ads developed and validated by Matz and colleagues20, and therefore recruited from141
the same population as they did (i.e., female participants from the UK between 18 and 40142
years old). In Experiment 1, participants received feedback on their personality (including143
a general description of the personality dimension), in terms of either their age-matched144
relative extraversion score (relevant personality feedback, see Fig. 1A and Fig. S3; for full145
questionnaire, see Fig. S1; items were taken from Srivastava and colleagues33) or their146
a nity for technology interaction (ATI34; control feedback, not relevant to the personality147
dimension in question, see Fig. S4; for questionnaire, see Fig. S2). Participants were then148
presented with 10 beauty ads (taken from Matz et al.20; see Fig. S8); half of which tar-149
geted extraverts and the other half introverts. Participants were asked to decide whether150
each ad was or was not targeted towards their personality (Fig. 1B). A comprehension151
check ensured that participants understood the instruction (see Fig. S7). However, the152
specific targeting strategy—that is, that it targeted extraverts vs. introverts—was not153
revealed to participants. The hypothesis here was:154
• H1: Participants who reflect on and receive feedback about their relative score on155
the relevant personality dimension (extraversion; boosting condition) are better able156
to identify ads that are targeted towards them than are participants who reflect on157
and receive feedback about their relative score on an unrelated personality dimension158
(ATI; control condition).159
Experiment 2 aimed to disentangle the mechanisms underlying these e↵ects: (1) im-160
plicitly hinting at the targeting strategy of the advertiser by describing the relevant per-161
sonality dimension, (2) encouraging people to reflect on their own position on the rele-162
8
vant personality dimension by having them complete a questionnaire (without providing163
feedback), and (3) explicitly providing individual feedback on the relevant personality164
dimension (i.e., degree of extraversion vs. introversion). Experiment 2 was similar to Ex-165
periment 1, di↵ering in only two respects. First, half the participants saw only a general166
description of the relevant personality dimension prior to the detection task (see Fig. S5167
and S6 for screenshots). Second, the other half completed the corresponding personality168
questionnaire (Fig. S1 and S2) after seeing the general description, but did not receive any169
feedback. Thus, Experiment 2 employed a 2 (control vs. boosting) ⇥ 2 (description only170
vs. description plus questionnaire) between-subjects design. We tested three mutually171
exclusive follow-up hypotheses (conditional on hypothesis H1 being supported):172
• H2a: The boosting intervention increases accuracy primarily by raising people’s173
awareness of the specific targeting strategy (i.e., di↵erential targeting of extraverts174
and introverts). This implies that people already have su cient self-knowledge175
about their extraversion level and spontaneously apply this knowledge to the task.176
Thus, fostering self-knowledge is not necessary for boosting accuracy.177
• H2b: Raising people’s awareness of the specific targeting strategy is not su cient to178
increase accuracy. People need to actively reflect on their own relevant personality179
dimensions to recognise that they are being targeted. This also means that simply180
providing warnings and explanations on platforms will not su ce to enable people181
to detect microtargeting.182
• H2c: Neither of the above mechanisms apply; knowledge about one’s relative score183
on the targeted personality dimension (i.e., explicit feedback on one’s level of extra-184
vs. introversion) is required to boost accuracy. This implies that the main reason185
for people failing to detect microtargeting is a lack of relevant and accurate self-186
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knowledge about the relevant personality dimension.187
Results188
Experiment 1. Fig. 2 shows that Experiment 1 supported hypothesis H1: Relative to189
the control condition, participants in the boosting condition on average correctly identi-190
fied 26 percentage points more ads targeted at them (95% Bayesian credible interval, CI:191
18–35)—raising the mean accuracy from 64% (95% CI: 53–73) to 90% (95% CI: 85–94).192
This di↵erence corresponds to an e↵ect size, expressed in terms of the “common language193
e↵ect size”35, of CL = 0.78 (95% CI: .70–.84), which here indicates the probability that a194
randomly selected participant from the boosting condition has higher detection accuracy195
than a randomly selected participant from the control condition. A value of 0.5 would196
imply no di↵erence and 1 would imply perfect separation between conditions. Additional197
analyses, detailed in the Supplementary Information (Supplementary Fig. S9–S11), attest198
to the robustness of these results. To summarize, the intervention worked (a) for both199
extraverts and introverts, (b) di↵erent levels of education, (c) irrespective of whether par-200
ticipants were clearly or more tentatively classified as extravert or introvert; moreover, the201
e↵ect (d) was stronger for extraverts than for introverts and (e) also emerged when we mea-202
sured detection performance independently of any response tendency (lenient vs. strict),203
in terms of the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve36 (AUC; based on204
participants’ confidence in their detection decisions). Overall, these results demonstrate205
that it is possible to improve people’s ability to detect targeted advertisements through206
a short, simple boosting intervention.207
Although the results of Experiment 1 were unambiguous, the study left one key ques-208
tion unanswered: What drives the intervention’s success? Is it su cient to hint at the209







































Figure 2: E↵ect of boosting and control interventions on the accuracy of detect-
ing targeted advertisements (Experiment 1). See Fig. 1 for the experimental setup,
where participants in the boosting conditions received feedback about their extraversion
prior to the task. Point ranges show the Bayesian point estimate and 95% Bayesian cred-
ible interval for the probability of correctly detecting a targeted advertisement (based on
a multilevel logistic regression model; see Methods for details). In the boxplots, the box
shows the the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles). The lower and
upper whiskers extend from the respective end of the box to the largest value no further
than 1.5 ⇥ IQR from the box (where IQR is the inter-quartile range, or distance between
the first and third quartiles); outliers are not displayed. The area of the dots and their
numbers denote the within-condition percentage of participants for each of the 11 possible
values for a participant’s proportion of correct decisions (given the 10 ads).
sary that participants also reflect on their own relevant personality dimensions (H2b)? Or211
is explicit knowledge of one’s relative score on the relevant personality dimension required212
(H2c)? In Experiment 2, we set out to tease apart these three di↵erent mechanisms.213
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Experiment 2. The results of Experiment 2 support hypothesisH2b (Fig. 3): reflect-214
ing on one’s relevant personality dimensions—without receiving any relevant feedback—215
is necessary, but also su cient to boost people’s ability to identify ads that have been216
targeted at them. The boosting condition that included the extraversion questionnaire217
improved participants’ performance by, on average, 10 percentage points (95% CI: 2–20)218
compared to the boosting condition with only the extraversion description, raising mean219
accuracy from 72% (95% CI: 63–81) to 83% (95% CI: 76–88); this di↵erence corresponds220
to a common language e↵ect size of CL = .62 (95% CI: .52–.71). This positive e↵ect is221
at odds with hypothesis H2c, according to which explicit knowledge of one’s level on the222
relevant personality dimension is necessary for the intervention to work. By contrast, par-223
ticipants who only read the extraversion description performed no better than participants224
who read the unrelated description of the ATI personality dimension (CL = .52, 95%:225
.43–.62); the latter participants correctly identified 70% of the ads (95% CI: 61–77). This226
result is at odds with hypothesis H2a, according to which hinting at the strategy used by227
the advertiser is su cient for the intervention to work. Importantly, the e↵ectiveness of228
self-reflection was not generic: performance was boosted only when people reflected on the229
relevant personality dimension. Participants who read the unrelated description of ATI230
and then completed the ATI questionnaire correctly identified 68% of the targeted ads231
(95% CI: 57–77)—that is, 15 percentage points (95 CI: 7–24) fewer than the participants232
who reflected on the relevant personality dimension (i.e., extraversion; CL = .66, 95%:233
58–74).234
Additional analyses, detailed in the Supplementary Information (Supplementary Fig. S12–235
S14), attest to the robustness of these results. To summarize, the results hold (a) for both236
extraverts and introverts, (b) di↵erent levels of education; moreover, the e↵ect (c) was237






























































Questionnaire a awithout with
Figure 3: E↵ect of boosting and control interventions on the accuracy of de-
tecting targeted advertisements (Experiment 2). Participants in the boosting
conditions either just read a description of the relevant personality dimension prior to the
task (“without questionnaire”), or additionally filled out the short questionnaire from Ex-
periment 1, but without feedback (“with questionnaire”). Point ranges show the Bayesian
point estimate and 95% Bayesian credible interval for the probability of correctly detect-
ing a targeted advertisement (based on a multilevel logistic regression model; see Methods
for details). In the boxplots, the box shows the the first and third quartiles (the 25th
and 75th percentiles). The lower and upper whiskers extend from the respective end of
the box to the largest value no further than 1.5 ⇥ IQR from the box (where IQR is the
inter-quartile range, or distance between the first and third quartiles); outliers are not
displayed. The area of the dots and their numbers denote the within-condition percentage
of participants for each of the 11 possible values for a participant’s proportion of correct
decisions (given 10 ads).
tection performance independently of any response tendency (lenient vs. strict), in terms239
of the AUC36 (based on participants’ confidence in their detection decisions). However,240
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for moderately extraverted participants, we did not observe an e↵ect of filling out the rel-241
evant (vs. unrelated) questionnaire (Fig. S12 & S13); for those participants the explicit242
feedback about their personality seems necessary for improving their detection accuracy243
(cf. Experiment 1). In summary, Experiment 2 showed that the boosting intervention can244
improve detection accuracy even without provision of explicit feedback, whereas merely245
describing the relevant personality dimension was insu cient.246
Conclusion247
Two experiments demonstrated that prompting people to reflect on a targeted personality248
dimension—by means of a short and simple intervention—boosts their ability to identify249
ads that target them on the basis of that personality dimension. Merely providing a250
description of the targeted personality dimension did not enhance detection accuracy.251
Completing a short personality questionnaire about the targeted personality dimension252
was su cient to increase accuracy—even if people did not receive any feedback. This253
result resonates with the recent finding that simple interventions, such as exposing misin-254
formation strategies, can help to inoculate people against misinformation strategies37;38.255
Further research needs to clarify the cognitive mechanisms underlying these e↵ects; the256
extent to which the observed increases in detection ability translate into improved down-257
stream outcomes (e.g., in terms evaluating and responding to ads); and the extent to which258
the e↵ects generalize to other personality dimensions, domains (e.g., political advertising259
or misinformation), and populations.260
Boosting interventions—which by definition target people’s competences—have the261
advantage that they can often be deployed independently of any platform or technology.262
That is, they do not need to interface with a platform’s information architecture and are263
therefore not dependent on the platform’s cooperation (in terms of access and maintaining264
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interoperability). Compared with, say, an intervention where advertisements are labelled265
within the platform’s interface, an intervention targeting people’s competences is therefore266
more robust with respect to constantly changing technology, advertising strategies, and267
the tech companies’ level of cooperation. Furthermore, as boosting interventions aim to268
improve people’s competences, they have the potential to generalize beyond the immediate269
context in which they were initially deployed32;39. Self-reflection tools aimed at helping270
people increase their awareness of their vulnerabilities to microtargeting could be deployed271
on independent websites or apps—or even as “analogue” tools (e.g., a checklist on a272
printed flyer). Such tools would need to cover a range of the most relevant microtargeting273
dimensions in order to o↵er e↵ective protection.274
Going one step further: Because the GDPR requires platforms to disclose what data275
they hold about their users, it is now feasible in many countries to implement tools276
aiming to raise user awareness of the specific data held on them. The information pages277
established by some platformsk in principle allow every motivated and technically savvy278
user to download their personal dataset and explore what is known about them. Digital279
boosting tools could automatically access this information and provide simple interfaces280
that encourage active exploration. Such tools could empower less tech-savvy users to281
find out what platforms know about them—information that might enable the precise282
targeting of commercial or political advertising. This could be done without processing283
the user’s personal data in any way; as we have shown, the intervention was e↵ective even284
without personalized feedback—the only necessary condition was active reflection on the285
part of the user.286
The platforms’ lack of transparency about their data handling and business practices287




makers and other stakeholders also need to consider the issue of “e↵ective transparency,”289
that is, when and how platforms’ transparency systems with respect to, say, microtar-290
geting practices actually empower users in practice—and are not simply an exercise in291
“nominal transparency.” Just because something is technically or legally “transparent”292
does not guarantee that users can or will engage with it—and even if they do, they still293
may not understand what it means for them.294
Our findings showed that merely describing a personality dimension does not su ce295
to improve people’s ability to detect microtargeting. This finding raises the more general296
question of whether other measures aiming to achieve transparency by merely describing297
information to users—such as Google’s https://myactivity.google.com or Facebook’s298
https://facebook.com/your_information—may likewise fail to help users understand299
this data and how it is used.300
To conclude, our findings support a vision of e↵ective transparency, where platforms—301
and other players—provide tools that help people to actively explore and reflect on the302
information held about them, thereby boosting their awareness of that knowledge—instead303
of steering people away from it by burying privacy settings deep within the settings menu304
or dumping large amounts of unstructured data on users and leaving them to sort it305
out for themselves. We argue that a boosting approach is a promising component in a306
broader, evidence-based policy mix aimed at giving people the necessary legal rights and307
competences to reclaim their individual autonomy in the online world7;23.308
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Methods309
All data and code are publicly available at https://osf.io/ne4r9/.310
Experiment 1. The preregistration of the study can be accessed at http://aspredicted.311
org/blind.php?x=wu6sk7 and includes, among other things, the research question, hy-312
pothesis H1, the primary outcome variable, planned sample size, exclusion criteria, and313
the exact specification of the multilevel logistic regression model detailed below. We report314
all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures used in the study (see Simmons315
et al.40). The experiment was programmed using formr (https://formr.org)41.316
Participants. We collected responses from 318 participants (boosting condition N =317
158, control condition N = 160, randomly allocated on the fly) via Prolific Academic, an318
online survey platform whose participants are more diverse and less familiar with exper-319
imental procedures than Amazon Mechanical Turk workers42. Mirroring the population320
targeted in20, we recruited female participants between the ages of 18 and 40 years who321
were UK residents fluent in English; we did not invite participants who already partici-322
pated in a pilot study, via the prescreening functionality of Prolific. Participants received323
£2 for completing the study. Consistent with the preregistered exclusion criteria, we ex-324
cluded 25 participants for non-completion (13 in the boosting condition, 12 in the control325
condition), 2 participants for giving di↵erent responses to the two age questions (1 in the326
boosting condition, 1 in the control condition), and 6 participants for failing the compre-327
hension check (4 in the boosting condition, 2 in the control condition). We also excluded328
1 participant (from the boosting condition) with a relative extraversion percentile of ex-329
actly 50%, as no extraversion personality type can be assigned for participants with this330
value (see Conditions for further information). The final sample thus comprised 286 par-331
ticipants, N = 139 in the control condition and N = 145 in the boosting condition. The332
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median age of participants was 30 years (first and third quartile: Q1 = 26 and Q3 = 34333
years).334
Conditions. In the boosting condition, participants completed an 8-item extraversion335
questionnaire (see Fig. S1). Based on their responses, they received personalized feed-336
back (see Fig. 1a and Fig. S3) on their extraversion score relative to a large sample of337
online participants (from Srivastava et al.33); this was truthful feedback, calculated for338
each participant on the fly. In particular, participants were told whether their personality339
tended more towards extraversion (“You are extraverted”) or introversion (“You are intro-340
verted”). A participant’s percentile was shown both numerically and visually, expressed341
as how many of 100 random people were more and less extraverted (for participants cat-342
egorized as extraverts) or introverted (for participants categorized as introverts) than the343
participant themselves. The feedback was accompanied by a simple definition of extraver-344
sion adopted from Wikipedia⇤⇤ (see Fig. 1 and S3). We enforced a 1-minute wait on the345
feedback screen to ensure that participants encoded the feedback. The control condition346
followed the same procedure, but participants completed an unrelated, 9-item question-347
naire tapping their propensity to naturally interact with technical systems (A nity for348
Technology Interaction, ATI; for full questionnaire, see Fig. S2). The ATI feedback and349
the description of the dimension was presented in a format analogous to that used in the350
boosting condition (see Fig. S5).351
Questions and distributional information for the raw scores were adopted from Srivas-352
tava and colleagues33 for extraversion and from Franke et al.34 for ATI. Srivastava et al.33353
provide the mean and standard deviation (SD) of the raw scores for each age year between354
21 and 60; we were thus able to provide age-matched feedback for extra-/introversion (for355




the mean and SD of the sample “S5-full” reported in Franke et al.34 (i.e., no age-specific357
norms were available). To achieve consistency across questionnaires, we presented both358
questionnaires on a 5-point Likert scale. Because the ATI norm study34 used a 6-point359
scale, we rescaled the mean and SD (original norm values M = 3.61, SD = 1.09, rescaled360
values M = 3.09, SD = 0.86). See SI for extraversion and ATI questionnaires and sam-361
ple feedback (Figs. S1 and S2 for questionnaires; Figs. 1a, S3 and S4 for feedback and362
definitions).363
Ad targeting detection task. We presented the female participants with 10 ads for364
beauty products (taken from Matz et al.20) in random order. Five of the ads were specif-365
ically designed to target extraverts; five target introverts (for the full set of stimuli, see366
Fig. S8). Each ad consisted of a picture and a slogan. “Extraverted” ads emphasized367
socially stimulating contexts (e.g., “Love the spotlight”), whereas “introverted” ads em-368
phasized socially less stimulating contexts (e.g., “Beauty isn’t always about being on369
show”). The original study20 validated the stimuli by showing that extraverted ads were370
rated as more extraverted than introverted ads (and vice versa) and that microtargeting371
extraverts and introverts on Facebook led to higher sales of actual products in a web shop372
(relative to mismatched ads).373
Right before the beginning of the ad targeting detection task, participants received374
the following instructions: “In the following you will be shown ads that are all designed375
for women, but are additionally targeted at di↵erent personality types. Please identify376
those that target yourself: Do you think the ad is designed to appeal to people with377
your personality? Or do you think it is designed to appeal to people with a di↵erent378
personality?” That is, in this study, microtargeting was defined as addressing participants379
by tailoring ads to aspects of their personality. This was followed by a comprehension380
check (see Fig. S7): “Please complete the following sentence. For the following ads, I need381
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to rate whether I think the ad is ...,” followed by the options “copied from a previous ad,”382
“targeted towards my personality type,” “appealing to me,” and “going to be e↵ective383
when aired.” If participants did not select “targeted towards my personality type,” the384
question was repeated (max. two times) with the response options presented in a di↵erent385
order. As per preregistration, we included participants in the analysis only if they passed386
the comprehension check within the maximum of three attempts. For each ad, participants387
were then asked whether it was targeted towards their personality type: “Do you think388
this ad is targeted at you?” (“yes” vs. “no”; see Fig. 1b). Participants also indicated389
their decision confidence by responding to the question “How confident are you with your390
choice?” (Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not confident” to 5 = “very confident”).391
Primary outcome measure. The primary dependent variable was a participant’s deci-392
sion about whether or not a particular ad was targeted towards her personality (“yes” vs.393
“no”). We classified each participant as either extravert (percentile > 50%) or introvert394
(percentile < 50%) on the basis of their percentile rank for extraversion. Based on this395
categorization, each participant’s decisions were then scored as either correct or incorrect.396
Specifically, a decision was scored as correct if an extraverted participant responded that397
an extraverted ad was targeted at her or an introverted ad was not targeted at her. A398
decision was scored as incorrect if she responded that an extraverted ad was not targeted399
at her or that an introverted ad was targeted at her. The opposite coding was used for400
introverted participants.401
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the boost-402
ing condition, participants first completed the extraversion questionnaire and received403
feedback on their relative extraversion score (see Fig. 1a), then evaluated the targeting404
of the ads, and finally completed the ATI questionnaire and were given feedback on their405
relative ATI score (see Fig. S4). In the control condition, the position of the extraversion406
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and ATI questionnaires (plus their respective feedback) was switched. Participants were407
asked to indicate their age in both the extraversion and the ATI questionnaire; this mea-408
sure was used as a response consistency measure (see exclusion criteria). At the end of409
the study, a question about education was administered.410
Statistical analysis. We used a Bayesian multilevel logistic regression model imple-411
mented in the R package brms 43;44 and its default, vague priors (see code for exact spec-412
ifications). The preregistered model’s syntax is413
correct ~ 1 + condition + (1 | id) + (1 + condition | stimuli)414
where correct is 1 for correct and 0 for incorrect classification decisions, condition415
is a deviation-coded factor variable for the boosting vs. control condition, id is a416
unique identifier for participants, and stimuli is a unique identifier for ads. Note that417
(1 + condition | stimuli) allows the treatment e↵ect to di↵er in size by ad. Four418
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains, each with 8,000 samples, were run; the419
first 8,000 samples were discarded as warm-up. The MCMC diagnostics indicated good420
convergence (see Supplementary Information).421
Posterior distributions were summarized using the median (point estimate) and 95%422
credible interval (uncertainty interval). Based on the model parameters (see Supplemen-423
tary Information for a summary table), we derived posterior distributions for several key424
statistics of interest: (a) the probability of a correct detection decision in both conditions,425
(b) the percentage point di↵erence, and (c) e↵ect sizes between the two conditions.426
We express e↵ect sizes using the “common language e↵ect size” (CL)35, which in-427
dicates the probability that a randomly selected participant from one condition has a428
higher value than a randomly selected participant from another condition; a value of 0.5429
implies no di↵erence and 1 would imply perfect separation between conditions. CL is well430
suited to compare conditions in a multilevel logistic regression model because—unlike431
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the commonly used measures of e↵ect size based on standardized mean di↵erences—CL432
is invariant to monotonical transformations. That is, its value does not depend on an433
arbitrary decision on whether to look at the results in log-odds or probability space. We434
derive the posterior distribution of a CL-comparison based on the model’s posterior dis-435
tributions for the participant-population mean and standard deviation in each condition436
(setting the item e↵ects to zero, that is, considering the average item).437
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, with the exceptions438
specified here. This study’s preregistration can be accessed at http://aspredicted.org/439
blind.php?x=39ik6v and includes, among other things, the research question, hypotheses440
H2a–c, the primary outcome variable, planned sample size, exclusion criteria, and the441
exact specification of the multilevel logistic regression model detailed below. We report all442
data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study (see Simmons et al.40).443
Participants. 638 participants (boosting condition with questionnaire N = 173,444
boosting condition without questionnaire N = 130, control condition with questionnaire445
N = 164, control condition without questionnaire N = 171, randomly allocated on the446
fly), recruited from Prolific Academic, received £2 for completing the study. Experiment447
2 involved two additional prescreening criteria on Prolific, namely, that they had not par-448
ticipated in Experiment 1, its pilot, or a pilot study for Experiment 2. Consistent with449
the preregistered exclusion criteria, we excluded 78 participants for non-completion (16450
in the boosting condition with questionnaire, 10 in the boosting condition without ques-451
tionnaire, 29 in the control with questionnaire, 23 in the control without questionnaire), 5452
participants for an extraversion percentile of exactly 0.5 (3 in the boosting condition with-453
out questionnaire, 2 in the control with questionnaire), 2 participants for giving di↵erent454
responses for the two age questions (1 in the boosting condition with questionnaire, 1 in455
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the control with questionnaire), and 10 participants for failing the comprehension check456
(3 in the boosting condition with questionnaire, 3 in the boosting condition without ques-457
tionnaire, 2 in the control with questionnaire, 2 in the control without questionnaire).458
Our final sample size was thus 544 participants: boosting condition with questionnaire:459
N = 153 (i.e., 88% retained); boosting condition without questionnaire: N = 114 (i.e.,460
88% retained); control condition with questionnaire: N = 131 (i.e., 80% retained); and461
control condition without questionnaire: N = 146 (i.e., 85% retained). The median age462
of participants was 29 years (first and third quartiles: Q1 = 24 and Q3 = 34 years).463
Treatments. We tested two simplifications of the intervention implemented in Ex-464
periment 1: providing no feedback on the questionnaire and providing only a relevant465
definition. Here, before completing the ad targeting detection task, participants were466
shown a definition of either extraversion (relevant personality dimension, see Fig. S5) or467
ATI (control personality dimension, see Fig. S6). Within each of these two groups, half of468
the participants additionally completed the same questionnaire on the respective person-469
ality dimension as in Experiment 1, but without any feedback. In contrast to Experiment470
1, where the definition of the personality dimension was shown along with the feedback471
(based on the previously completed questionnaire), all participants in Experiment 2 first472
saw a definition of the respective personality dimension.473
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (In-474
tervention relevance: boosting vs. control) ⇥ 2 (Intervention type: Definition only vs.475
Definition + Questionnaire) between-subjects design. In both boosting conditions, par-476
ticipants first received a description of the relevant personality dimension: extraversion477
(see Fig. S5). In the questionnaire conditions, participants then additionally completed478
the relevant extraversion inventory (see Fig. S1). Participants in both boosting condi-479
tions were then asked to identify ads targeted towards their personality. After the ad480
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targeting detection task, they were given feedback on their relative extraversion score (as481
in Experiment 1, see Figs. 1a, S3, and S4); they then completed the ATI questionnaire482
and were given feedback on their relative ATI score (see Fig. S4). Because all feedback483
was provided after the detection task, it could not have any e↵ect on the detection task;484
we included the feedback simply to satisfy participants’ curiosity. For the two control485
conditions, the position of the extraversion and ATI descriptions (and, in the case of the486
condition with questionnaire, the corresponding questionnaire) was switched.487
Statistical analysis. The preregistered model’s syntax is488
correct ~ 1 + relevance * questionnaire + (1 | id)489
+ (1 + relevance * questionnaire | stimuli)490
where correct is 1 for correct and 0 for incorrect classification decisions, relevance is491
a deviation-coded factor variable for the boosting vs. control conditions (i.e., relevant492
vs. unrelated personality dimension, respectively), questionnaire is a deviation-coded493
factor variable indicating whether or not participants were administered a questionnaire,494
id is a unique identifier for participants, and stimuli is a unique identifier for ads.495
relevance * questionnaire indicates that the model includes the two main e↵ects as496
well as the interaction relevance : questionnaire. Note that497
(1 + relevance * questionnaire | stimuli)498
allows the treatment e↵ects (i.e., two main e↵ects and their interaction) to di↵er in size by499
ad. Four MCMC chains, each with 8,000 samples, were run; the first 4,000 samples were500
discarded as warm-up. The MCMC diagnostics indicated good convergence (see Supple-501
mentary Information). Based on the model’s parameters (see Supplementary Information502
for a summary table), we derived posterior distributions for several key statistics of inter-503
est: (a) the probability of a correct detection decision in each condition, (b) percentage504
point di↵erences, and (c) e↵ect sizes between conditions. For more information on the505
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analysis approach, see Experiment 1 above.506
References507
[1] Kosinski, M., Stillwell, D. & Graepel, T. Private traits and attributes are predictable508
from digital records of human behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of509
Sciences 110, 5802–5805 (2013).510
[2] Hinds, J. & Joinson, A. N. What demographic attributes do our digital footprints511
reveal? A systematic review. PLOS ONE 13, e0207112 (2018).512
[3] Deng, A. et al. A/B testing at scale: Accelerating software innovation. In SIGIR513
’17: Proceedings of the 40th International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and514
Development in Information Retrieval, 1395–1397 (Association for Computing Ma-515
chinery, New York, NY, 2017). URL https://doi.org/10.1145/3077136.3082060.516
[4] Künzel, S. R., Sekhon, J. S., Bickel, P. J. & Yu, B. Metalearners for estimating517
heterogeneous treatment e↵ects using machine learning. Proceedings of the National518
Academy of Sciences 116, 4156–4165 (2019).519
[5] Nissenbaum, H. A contextual approach to privacy online. Daedalus 140, 32–48520
(2011).521
[6] Auxier, B. et al. Americans and privacy: Concerned, confused and feeling lack of522
control over their personal information. Pew Research Center (2019, November 15).523
[7] Lorenz-Spreen, P., Lewandowsky, S., Sunstein, C. R. & Hertwig, R. How behavioural524
sciences can promote truth, autonomy and democratic discourse online. Nature Hu-525
man Behaviour 4, 1102–1109 (2020).526
25
[8] Vazire, S. & Carlson, E. N. Self-knowledge of personality: Do people know them-527
selves? Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4, 605–620 (2010).528
[9] Coppock, A., Hill, S. J. & Vavreck, L. The small e↵ects of political advertising are529
small regardless of context, message, sender, or receiver: Evidence from 59 real-time530
randomized experiments. Science Advances 6 (2020).531
[10] Heawood, J. Pseudo-public political speech: Democratic implications of the Cam-532
bridge Analytica scandal. Information Polity 23, 429–434 (2018).533
[11] Edelson, L., Sakhuja, S., Dey, R. & McCoy, D. An analysis of United States online534
political advertising transparency. arXiv.org 1902.04385 (2019).535
[12] Dan, V. & Arendt, F. Visual cues to the hidden agenda: Investigating the e↵ects of536
ideology-related visual subtle backdrop cues in political communication. The Inter-537
national Journal of Press/Politics 1940161220936593 (2020).538
[13] Ali, M. et al. Discrimination through optimization: How facebook’s ad delivery539
can lead to biased outcomes. Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact. 3 (2019). URL540
https://doi.org/10.1145/3359301.541
[14] Ali, M., Sapiezynski, P., Korolova, A., Mislove, A. & Rieke, A. Ad delivery algo-542
rithms: The hidden arbiters of political messaging. ArXiv 1912.04255 (2019).543
[15] Bakshy, E., Eckles, D., Yan, R. & Rosenn, I. Social influence in social advertising:544
Evidence from field experiments. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on545
Electronic Commerce, EC ’12, 146–161 (Association for Computing Machinery, New546
York, NY, USA, 2012). URL https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229027.547
26
[16] Medina Serrano, J. C., Papakyriakopoulos, O. & Hegelich, S. Exploring political ad548
libraries for online advertising transparency: Lessons from germany and the 2019549
european elections. In International Conference on Social Media and Society, SM-550
Society’20, 111–121 (Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA,551
2020). URL https://doi.org/10.1145/3400806.3400820.552
[17] Bolden, S. E., McKernan, B. & Stromer-Galley, J. Facebook political advertising553
transparency report. Tech. Rep., Syracuse University (2020).554
[18] Kozyreva, A., Lorenz-Spreen, P., Hertwig, R., Lewandowsky, S. & Herzog, S. M.555
Public attitudes towards algorithmic personalization and use of personal data online:556
Evidence from germany, great britain, and the us (2020). URL psyarxiv.com/3q4mg.557
[19] Youyou, W., Kosinski, M. & Stillwell, D. Computer-based personality judgments are558
more accurate than those made by humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of559
Sciences 112, 1036–1040 (2015).560
[20] Matz, S. C., Kosinski, M., Nave, G. & Stillwell, D. J. Psychological targeting as an561
e↵ective approach to digital mass persuasion. Proceedings of the National Academy562
of Sciences 114, 12714–12719 (2017).563
[21] Winter, S., Maslowska, E. & Vos, A. L. The e↵ects of trait-based personalization in564
social media advertising. Computers in Human Behavior 114, 106525 (2021). URL565
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563220302776.566
[22] Zarouali, B., Dobber, T., Pauw, G. D. & de Vreese, C. Using a personality-567
profiling algorithm to investigate political microtargeting: Assessing the persua-568
sion e↵ects of personality-tailored ads on social media. Communication Research569
0093650220961965 (2020).570
27
[23] Kozyreva, A., Lewandowsky, S. & Hertwig, R. Citizens versus the internet: Con-571
fronting digital challenges with cognitive tools. Psychological Science in the Public572
Interest (in press).573
[24] Nouwens, M., Liccardi, I., Veale, M., Karger, D. & Kagal, L. Dark patterns after the574
GDPR: Scraping consent pop-ups and demonstrating their influence. In CHI ’20:575
Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,576
1–13 (Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, 2020). URL https:577
//doi.org/10.1145/3313831.3376321.578
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1 Screenshots of Experiments
1.1 Personality questionnaires
Figure S1: Extraversion personality questionnaire used in Experiments 1 and 2.
These 8 items are a subset of the 44-items extraversion scale2
.
2
Figure S2: A nity for Technology Interaction (ATI) questionnaire used in Ex-
periments 1 and 2. Items are taken from Franke et al.3.
3
1.2 Personality feedback screens
Figure S3: Personality feedback and description used in the boosting condition
in Experiment 1 (i.e., the relevant personality dimension: extraversion). This screen-
shot is an example for a participant classified as extravert; for participants classified as
introverts, the the feedback is reframed in terms of intraversion (i.e., the title reads “You
are introverted” and the text below reads “You are more introverted than [XX] out of 100
people of your age” and “You are less introverted than [100   XX] out of 100 people of
your age”, where [XX] is the respective percentile). This definition of extraversion is
adapted from Wikipedia (https://web.archive.org/web/20190801042657/https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraversion_and_introversion. See Methods in the main
text for details on how the percentile was calculated.
4
Figure S4: Personality feedback and description used in the control condition
in Experiment 1 (i.e., the irrelevant personality dimension: A nity for Technology,
ATI3). This screenshot is an example for a participant classified as technology a ne; for
participants classified as not technology a ne, the the feedback is reframed in terms of
technology aversion (i.e., the title reads “You are technology averse” and the text below
reads “You are more averse than [XX] out of 100 people” and “You are less averse than
[100  XX] out of 100 people”, where [XX] is the respective percentile). See Methods in
the main text for details on how the percentile was calculated.
5
1.3 Descriptions of personality dimensions
Figure S5: Description of the extraversion personality dimension, used in the
boosting condition in Experiment 2. This definition of extraversion is adapted from
Wikipedia (https://web.archive.org/web/20190801042657/https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Extraversion_and_introversion).
Figure S6: Description of the A nity for Technology scale (ATI) used in the
control condition in Experiment 2. This definition is taken from Franke et al.3.
6
1.4 Comprehension check
Figure S7: Comprehension check used in Experiments 1 and 2 prior to starting
the detection task. If a participant did not choose the correct answer (“targeted towards
my personality type”), the questions was shown again up to two more times, alongside
the note ”The last answer was not correct, please try again:” (i.e., a total maximum
of three attempts). The response options were sorted di↵erently after each incorrect
response. Only participants who passed the comprehension check within three attempts
were included in the analysis (see Methods in the main text and the preregistrations).
7
1.5 Stimuli: The 10 ads from Matz and colleagues
1
Figure S8: Stimuli: The 10 ads used in Experiments 1 and 2. The ads in the left
column are tailored to extraverts and the ads in the right column to introverts. Images




















































































































Figure S9: Detection performance (in terms of proportion of correct decisions),
boosting intervention, and level of extraversion (Experiment 1). A Scatterplot
of participants’ accuracy (i.e., proportion correct decisions; y-axis) and their extraversion
percentile (from 0 most introverted to 1 most extraverted; x-axis) for boosting vs. control
group (color coded). Dots are slightly jittered vertically to avoid overplotting. Curves
and confidence bands show robust LOESS curves (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing
using re-descending M estimator with Tukey’s biweight function) and their 95% confidence
band. B Detection accuracy by extraversion quartiles (x-axis) for boosting vs. control
group (color coded). In the boxplots, the box shows the the first and third quartiles (the
25th and 75th percentiles). The lower and upper whiskers extend from the respective end
of the box to the largest value no further than 1.5 ⇥ IQR from the box (where IQR is
the inter-quartile range, or distance between the first and third quartiles); outliers are
not displayed. The area of the dots and their numbers denote the within-quartile-and-
condition percentage of participants for each of the 11 possible values for a participant’s








































Figure S10: Detection performance (in terms of the area under the Receiver
Operating Characteristics curve, AUC, based on participants’ confidence rat-
ing), boosting intervention, and level of extraversion (Experiment 1). Detection
accuracy is quantified using the AUC based on participants’ confidence rating, using the
trapezoid method (i.e., no kernel- or model-based smoothing)4. In particular, this calcu-
lation uses a participant’s confidence that the ad is targeted towards them (implied by the
participant’s binary categorization decision and corresponding rating about how confident
the respondent is in the correctness of her decision). An AUC value can be interpreted
as the probability that a participant’s confidence (in the sense described above) is higher
for a randomly selected ad that actually targets this participant compared to a randomly
selected ad that does not actually target this participant. A Scatterplot of participants’
detection performance (i.e., AUC; y-axis) and their extraversion percentile (from 0 most
introverted to 1 most extraverted; x-axis) for boosting vs. control group (color coded).
Dots are slightly jittered vertically to avoid overplotting. Curves and confidence bands
show robust LOESS curves (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing using re-descending
M estimator with Tukey’s biweight function) and their 95% confidence band. B Detection
performance (i.e., AUC; y-axis) by extraversion quartiles (x-axis) for boosting vs. control
group (color coded). In the boxplots, the box shows the the first and third quartiles (the
25th and 75th percentiles). The lower and upper whiskers extend from the respective end
of the box to the largest value no further than 1.5 ⇥ IQR from the box (where IQR is




























































































































Figure S11: Detection performance, boosting intervention, and education (Ex-
periment 1). A Detection accuracy (i.e., proportion correct decisions; y-axis) by educa-
tion (x-axis) for boosting vs. control group (color coded). The area of the dots and their
numbers denote the within-education-and-condition percentage of participants for each of
the 11 possible values for a participant’s value of proportion of correct decisions (given the
10 ads). B Detection performance in terms of AUC (y-axis); see Fig S12 for more details
on AUC. Dots represent participants and are slightly jittered to avoid overplotting. In the
boxplots, the box shows the the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles).
The lower and upper whiskers extend from the respective end of the box to the largest
value no further than 1.5 ⇥ IQR from the box (where IQR is the inter-quartile range, or
distance between the first and third quartiles); outliers are not displayed. n denotes the
number of participants for each combination of education level and condition.
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2.1.2 Summary of multilevel logistic regression model
The text below shows the model summary of the brms Bayesian multilevel logistic regression
model5;6 reported for Experiment 1. See Methods in the main article for more information on
the coding of the variables. Estimate shows the median and l-95% and u-95% show the 95%
posterior credibility interval (i.e., the 2.5% and 97.5% percentile, respectively) of the respective
marginal posterior distribution. For more details see the R help file ?brms::summary.brmsfit⇤
Family: bernoulli
Links: mu = logit
Formula: dec_correct ~ 1 + condition + (1 | id) + (1 + condition | stimuli)
Data: tbl_targeting_1 (Number of observations: 2840)
Samples: 4 chains, each with iter = 8000; warmup = 4000; thin = 1;
total post-warmup samples = 16000
Group-Level Effects:
~id (Number of levels: 284)
Estimate Est.Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS
sd(Intercept) 1.52 0.11 1.32 1.75 1.00 6358 10048
~stimuli (Number of levels: 10)
Estimate Est.Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Rhat Bulk_ESS
sd(Intercept) 0.48 0.14 0.28 0.92 1.00 5852
sd(condition1) 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.63 1.00 6142






Estimate Est.Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS
Intercept 1.38 0.20 0.97 1.79 1.00 5350 8842
condition1 1.62 0.24 1.16 2.10 1.00 6967 10456
Samples were drawn using sampling(NUTS). For each parameter, Bulk_ESS
and Tail_ESS are effective sample size measures, and Rhat is the potential




2.2.1 Detection performance, boosting intervention, and level of extraversion
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Figure S12: Detection performance, boosting intervention, and level of extraver-
sion (Experiment 2). A Scatterplot of participants’ accuracy (i.e., proportion correct decisions;
y-axis) and their extraversion percentile (from 0 most introverted to 1 most extraverted; x-axis) for
boosting vs. control group (color coded) and without and with questionnaire (left & right subplot, re-
spectively). Dots are slightly jittered vertically to avoid overplotting. Curves and confidence bands show
robust LOESS curves (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing using re-descending M estimator with
Tukey’s biweight function) and their 95% confidence band. B Detection performance by extraversion
quartiles (x-axis) for boosting vs. control group (color coded) and without and with questionnaire (left
& right subplot, respectively). In the boxplots, the box shows the the first and third quartiles (the 25th
and 75th percentiles). The lower and upper whiskers extend from the respective end of the box to the
largest value no further than 1.5 ⇥ IQR from the box (where IQR is the inter-quartile range, or distance
between the first and third quartiles); outliers are not displayed. The area of the dots and their numbers
denote the within-quartile-and-condition percentage of participants for each of the 11 possible values for
a participant’s value of proportion of correct decisions (given the 10 ads).
14
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Figure S13: Detection performance (in terms of the area under the Receiver
Operating Characteristics curve, AUC, based on participants’ confidence rat-
ing), boosting intervention, and level of extraversion (Experiment 2). Detection
accuracy is quantified using the AUC based on participants’ confidence rating, using the trapezoid method
(i.e., no kernel- or model-based smoothing)4. In particular, this calculation uses a participant’s confi-
dence that the ad is targeted towards them (implied by the participant’s binary categorization decision
and corresponding rating about how confident the respondent is in the correctness of her decision). A
Scatterplot of participants’ detection performance (i.e., AUC; y-axis) and their extraversion percentile
(from 0 most introverted to 1 most extraverted; x-axis) for boosting vs. control group (color coded) and
without and with questionnaire (left & right subplot, respectively). B Detection performance (i.e., AUC;
y-axis) by extraversion quartiles (x-axis) for boosting vs. control group (color coded) and without and
with questionnaire (left & right subplot, respectively). See Fig S10 for more details on AUC and what



















































































































































n = 10 n = 41 n = 48 n = 32n = 13 n = 46 n = 57 n = 37
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Figure S14: Detection performance, boosting intervention, and education (Ex-
periment 2). A Detection accuracy (i.e., proportion correct decisions; y-axis) by education (x-axis)
for boosting vs. control group (color coded) and without and with questionnaire (left & right subplot,
respectively). The area of the dots and their numbers denote the within-education-and-condition per-
centage of participants for each of the 11 possible values for a participant’s value of proportion of correct
decisions (given the 10 ads). B Detection performance in terms of AUC (y-axis); see Fig S12 for more
details on AUC. Dots represent participants and are slightly jittered to avoid overplotting. In the box-
plots, the box shows the the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles). The lower and
upper whiskers extend from the respective end of the box to the largest value no further than 1.5 ⇥ IQR
from the box (where IQR is the inter-quartile range, or distance between the first and third quartiles);
outliers are not displayed. n denotes the number of participants for each combination of education level
and condition. 16
2.2.2 Summary of multilevel logistic regression model
The text below shows the model summary of the brms Bayesian multilevel logistic regression
model5;6 reported for Experiment 2. See Methods in the main article for more information on
the coding of the variables. Estimate shows the median and l-95% and u-95% show the 95%
posterior credibility interval (i.e., the 2.5% and 97.5% percentile, respectively) of the respective
marginal posterior distribution. For more details see the R help file ?brms::summary.brmsfit†
Family: bernoulli
Links: mu = logit
Formula: dec_correct ~ relevance + questionnaire + (1 | id) + (1 + relevance * questionnaire | stimuli) + relevance:questionnaire
Data: tbl_targeting_2 (Number of observations: 5440)
Samples: 4 chains, each with iter = 8000; warmup = 4000; thin = 1;
total post-warmup samples = 16000
Group-Level Effects:
~id (Number of levels: 544)
Estimate Est.Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS
sd(Intercept) 1.40 0.07 1.27 1.55 1.00 6481 10495
~stimuli (Number of levels: 10)
Estimate Est.Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS
sd(Intercept) 0.41 0.12 0.25 0.77 1.00 5748 9121
sd(relevance1) 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.28 1.00 11664 9450
sd(questionnaire1) 0.28 0.13 0.04 0.65 1.00 5596 5495
sd(relevance1:questionnaire1) 0.58 0.26 0.11 1.31 1.00 6164 5441
cor(Intercept,relevance1) 0.21 0.50 -0.73 0.88 1.00 28097 11260
cor(Intercept,questionnaire1) 0.26 0.37 -0.50 0.81 1.00 17768 12090
cor(relevance1,questionnaire1) 0.01 0.51 -0.80 0.80 1.00 7536 11636
cor(Intercept,relevance1:questionnaire1) -0.30 0.35 -0.82 0.45 1.00 16977 12192
cor(relevance1,relevance1:questionnaire1) -0.02 0.51 -0.82 0.80 1.00 7980 10940
cor(questionnaire1,relevance1:questionnaire1) 0.01 0.43 -0.74 0.72 1.00 12689 13190
Population-Level Effects:
Estimate Est.Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS
Intercept 1.03 0.15 0.71 1.36 1.00 4626 7232
relevance1 0.48 0.15 0.20 0.77 1.00 7812 10679
questionnaire1 0.25 0.17 -0.10 0.60 1.00 7967 10199
relevance1:questionnaire1 0.72 0.35 0.00 1.44 1.00 8380 10576
Samples were drawn using sampling(NUTS). For each parameter, Bulk_ESS
and Tail_ESS are effective sample size measures, and Rhat is the potential
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